Elections and Electoral Processes in India

Overview

India's elections are the largest democratic exercise in human history. With over 968 million registered voters as of the 2024 general elections, and a voting population that exceeds the entire population of all but two countries in the world, the logistics of conducting free and fair elections in India are staggering. Polling stations are set up in deserts, Himalayan villages, remote islands, and dense urban slums. Election officials travel by foot, boat, elephant, and helicopter to reach every eligible voter. The scale alone makes India's electoral machinery a remarkable administrative achievement.

But scale is not the only challenge. Indian elections are also fiercely contested, often violent, and increasingly expensive. Political parties spend thousands of crores on campaigns. Criminal candidates contest and win. Money, muscle power, and media manipulation distort the electoral playing field. Voter rolls are sometimes manipulated. Electronic voting machines are periodically challenged. Campaign finance has been opaque for decades, made worse by the electoral bonds scheme that was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2024. And the independence of the Election Commission itself has come under scrutiny, with allegations of partisan behavior in recent years.

This module provides a comprehensive guide to how India's electoral system works — and where it fails. You will learn about the structure and powers of the Election Commission, the mechanics of voter registration, the technology and controversies around EVMs, the rules governing campaign spending and disclosure, the Model Code of Conduct, and the legal framework for resolving election disputes. You will also learn about recent reforms, ongoing debates, and what ordinary citizens can do to protect the integrity of the electoral process. Understanding these mechanisms is not just academic — it is essential for anyone who wants to vote responsibly, report violations, or hold the electoral machinery accountable.

Source: Election Commission of India. Voter turnout = valid votes polled / electors in roll.

The Election Commission of India

The Election Commission of India (ECI) is a constitutional body established under Article 324 of the Constitution. It is responsible for the "superintendence, direction and control" of the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of elections to Parliament, state legislatures, and the offices of the President and Vice-President. The ECI does not conduct elections to panchayats and municipalities — those are conducted by State Election Commissions established under the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments.

Structure and Composition

The Election Commission originally consisted of a single Chief Election Commissioner (CEC). In 1993, two Election Commissioners were added, creating a three-member body. The CEC has a status equivalent to a Supreme Court judge, and the other Election Commissioners have equivalent rank. All three have equal say in decision-making, though the CEC is the first among equals and presides over meetings.

Under the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, the appointment of the CEC and Election Commissioners is made by a committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in Lok Sabha (or the leader of the largest opposition party), and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister. This replaced the earlier system where the President appointed them on the advice of the government. The 2023 Act was passed after the Supreme Court, in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023), held that the previous appointment process — where the executive alone made the selection — was unconstitutional and directed the government to create a more independent mechanism.

The CEC can be removed from office only through impeachment by Parliament, on the same grounds and procedure as a Supreme Court judge. The other Election Commissioners can be removed on the recommendation of the CEC. This asymmetry in removal procedure was intended to protect the CEC's independence, but it has also created tensions within the Commission when the other members disagree with the CEC.

Powers and Functions

• Delimitation of constituencies: The ECI determines the boundaries of parliamentary and assembly constituencies based on census data. Delimitation has been frozen since 1973 (with adjustments after 2001 and 2026) to prevent states that successfully control population growth from losing seats. This has created significant malapportionment, with some northern states now severely underrepresented relative to their population.
• Preparation and revision of electoral rolls: The ECI maintains the electoral rolls, conducts periodic summary revisions, and processes applications for inclusion, deletion, and correction of voter entries. Electoral rolls are published online and can be searched by name, age, or constituency.
• Registration of political parties: Political parties must register with the ECI to contest elections under a common symbol. Registered parties are classified as "national" or "state" parties based on their performance in elections. The ECI also recognizes registered unrecognised parties and assigns them symbols.
• Conduct of elections: The ECI announces the election schedule, notifies constituencies, accepts nominations, scrutinizes candidates, allots symbols, appoints polling and counting staff, and declares results. It also appoints observers and micro-observers to monitor polling and counting.
• Enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct: Once elections are announced, the MCC comes into force. The ECI monitors violations by candidates and parties, issues warnings, and can take punitive action including censure, suspension of campaign privileges, and even de-registration in extreme cases.
• Regulation of campaign expenditure: The ECI sets expenditure limits for candidates (not parties), monitors spending, and requires candidates to file expenditure accounts within 30 days of the election. However, enforcement is weak and the limits are widely regarded as unrealistic given actual campaign costs.
• Adjudication of election disputes: The ECI does not directly decide election petitions — those go to the High Courts. But it can disqualify candidates for corrupt practices, set aside elections in cases of grave irregularities, and refer matters to the courts.

Concerns About Independence

The independence of the Election Commission is the cornerstone of free and fair elections. Yet in recent years, the ECI has faced criticism from opposition parties, civil society, and the judiciary for perceived partiality. Specific concerns include:

• Uneven enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct: Opposition parties have repeatedly alleged that the ECI acts swiftly against their violations while ignoring or delaying action against ruling party leaders. The timing of enforcement actions — swift against opposition, slow against the government — has been a persistent source of grievance.
• Timing of elections: The ECI has the discretion to announce election schedules. Critics have alleged that the timing of state assembly elections has sometimes been manipulated to benefit the ruling party — by delaying elections in states where the opposition is gaining momentum or by advancing them where the ruling party is strong.
• Handling of complaints: The volume of complaints received by the ECI during elections is enormous, and the Commission has limited staff to process them. But the selective handling of high-profile complaints — acting on some while ignoring others — has damaged its credibility.
• Commissioner dissent: In 2024, one of the Election Commissioners reportedly dissented from decisions related to the release of voter turnout data and the handling of complaints against the Prime Minister. The dissent was not made public, and the Commissioner subsequently resigned, raising questions about internal transparency and pressure.
• Post-retirement appointments: Former Election Commissioners have sometimes been appointed to government positions or governorships after retirement, creating a perception — whether justified or not — that loyalty to the ruling party is rewarded. This has been a long-standing issue, affecting multiple commissions, not just the ECI.

These concerns do not mean the ECI is fundamentally compromised. India's elections remain broadly free and fair by global standards, and the ECI has a strong institutional record. But the erosion of its perceived independence is dangerous because it undermines public confidence in the electoral process. A democracy cannot function if half the population believes the referee is biased.

Voter Registration and Electoral Rolls

Every Indian citizen who is 18 years or older on the qualifying date (January 1 of the year of revision) has the right to be registered as a voter, unless disqualified by law. The right to vote is not a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution, but it is a statutory right under the Representation of the People Act, 1950. The ECI has made significant efforts to simplify registration, including online applications through the National Voters' Services Portal (NVSP) and the Voter Helpline App.

How to Register

• Online: Visit the National Voters' Services Portal (nvsp.in) or download the Voter Helpline App. Fill Form 6 with details including name, address, age, and family particulars. Upload proof of identity, proof of address, and a passport-size photograph. The application is processed by the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) of the constituency.
• Offline: Collect Form 6 from the ERO's office, fill it, and submit it with supporting documents. This is useful for those without internet access or digital literacy.
• Form 6A for overseas electors: Indian citizens living abroad can register as overseas electors by filling Form 6A. They must have a valid Indian passport and be absent from India due to employment, education, or other reasons. Overseas electors can vote in person at the polling station — they cannot vote by post or electronically.
• Form 7 for deletion: If a voter has died, shifted residence, or is wrongly enrolled in a constituency, any person can apply for deletion using Form 7. The ERO must give the affected person a hearing before deletion.
• Form 8 for correction: If details in the electoral roll are incorrect (name, address, age, photo, relation), the voter can apply for correction using Form 8.

Concerns About Electoral Rolls

Despite the ECI's efforts, India's electoral rolls are not perfect. Common problems include:

• Duplicate entries: A person may be registered in multiple constituencies, especially if they have moved but not applied for deletion in their old constituency. While each voter can vote only once, duplicate entries inflate the electoral roll and make turnout calculations misleading.
• Missing voters: Voters who have turned 18 but not registered, or whose applications were rejected, or who were accidentally deleted, are disenfranchised. Studies have found that urban poor, migrant workers, and marginalized communities are more likely to be missing from the rolls.
• Deletions without due process: There have been documented cases of mass deletions of voters, particularly in certain states, based on flawed criteria. In some cases, voters with similar names were deleted as "duplicates" without proper verification. The ECI has guidelines requiring a hearing before deletion, but these are not always followed in practice.
• Gender and caste gaps: The gender gap in voter registration has narrowed significantly over the years, but in some states, women are still underrepresented in the electoral rolls relative to their population. Caste-based discrimination in voter registration has also been reported in some areas, particularly where dominant castes control the local administration.
• Non-resident voters: There is no provision for remote voting for domestic migrants. A migrant worker registered in Bihar who has been working in Maharashtra for years must either travel back to Bihar to vote or remain disenfranchised. This disenfranchises millions of internal migrants, who are disproportionately poor and from marginalized communities. The ECI has piloted remote voting machines (RVMs) for domestic migrants, but these have not been rolled out at scale.

Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs)

India has used electronic voting machines since 1982, and since 2004, all Lok Sabha and state assembly elections have been conducted entirely with EVMs. The machines are designed and manufactured by two public sector undertakings: Bharat Electronics (Bengaluru) and Electronics Corporation of India (Hyderabad). There are no private companies involved in EVM production, and the source code is not open-source — it is held by the manufacturers under strict security protocols.

How EVMs Work

An EVM consists of two units: the Control Unit (CU) and the Balloting Unit (BU). The Control Unit is with the presiding officer; the Balloting Unit is placed in the voting compartment. When a voter presses a button next to the candidate's name and symbol, the vote is recorded in the Control Unit's memory. The machine is standalone — it is not connected to any network, Wi-Fi, or the internet. It runs on a battery and has no external ports. This design makes it theoretically impossible to hack remotely.

Since 2013, the ECI has also used Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) machines alongside EVMs. After a voter presses the button, the VVPAT prints a paper slip showing the candidate's name and symbol. The slip is visible to the voter through a glass window for seven seconds before it drops into a sealed box. The VVPAT provides a physical record of each vote that can be used for verification and recounting if the result is challenged.

Verification and Counting

• First-level check (FLC): Before deployment, every EVM and VVPAT is tested in the presence of political party representatives to ensure it is functioning correctly and records votes accurately.
• Randomization: EVMs are randomized twice before deployment — first at the district level and then at the polling station level — to prevent any party from knowing which machine will go to which booth. This is done in the presence of party representatives.
• Mock polls: On the morning of polling day, a mock poll is conducted at every polling station with at least 50 votes, and the results are shown to polling agents of all parties before the actual polling begins.
• Counting of VVPAT slips: Under the current ECI procedure, VVPAT slips from one randomly selected polling station per assembly segment are physically counted and matched with the EVM count. If there is a discrepancy, all VVPATs in that segment are counted. The Supreme Court, in 2024, directed the ECI to increase the number of VVPATs subject to physical verification.

Controversies and Criticisms

Despite the security measures, EVMs have been repeatedly challenged by losing parties and candidates. The most common allegations include:

• Tampering during transport: EVMs are stored in strong rooms after polling and transported to counting centers. Critics allege that machines can be swapped or manipulated during this period. The ECI has introduced GPS tracking, CCTV monitoring, and sealing protocols to prevent this, but concerns persist.
• Insider manipulation: Because the source code is not open-source, the possibility of manipulation at the manufacturing stage cannot be entirely ruled out. The ECI insists that the machines are tested by independent technical experts, but the lack of transparency around the source code is a persistent concern.
• Malfunctioning: In every election, some EVMs malfunction or fail to work. While replacements are provided, the delay can disenfranchise voters who leave the queue out of frustration. The rate of malfunction is low relative to the total number of machines, but it is not zero.
• Demand for paper ballots: Opposition parties have periodically demanded a return to paper ballots, citing distrust of EVMs. The ECI has resisted this, arguing that paper ballots are more susceptible to booth-capturing and manipulation. The Supreme Court has upheld the use of EVMs with VVPAT as a reasonable and reliable method.
• VVPAT verification percentage: Activists and some political parties have demanded that 100% of VVPAT slips be counted, or at least a much higher percentage than the current one-per-segment rule. The Supreme Court has incrementally increased the verification percentage, but a 100% count has not been ordered, primarily because of the logistical time and effort involved.

It is worth noting that no court in India has ever found evidence of systematic EVM tampering that affected the outcome of an election. The ECI's security protocols, while not perfect, are robust. However, the loss of public trust in EVMs — whether justified or not — is itself a problem for democracy. Transparency, including greater openness about the technical specifications and independent audits, would help restore confidence.

India's Election System

India uses the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system for elections to the Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies. Under this system, the candidate who receives the most votes in a constituency wins, regardless of whether they have a majority of the total votes. The FPTP system is simple, easy to understand, and produces clear winners — but it also produces significant distortions between vote share and seat share, and it tends to favor large, well-organized parties over smaller ones.

First-Past-the-Post: Pros and Cons

• Simplicity: Voters understand it easily. Counting is straightforward. Results are declared quickly. This is important in a country with low literacy and limited administrative capacity.
• Stable governments: FPTP tends to produce single-party or stable coalition governments because it rewards parties with concentrated support. This is in contrast to proportional representation systems, which often produce fragmented parliaments and unstable coalitions.
• Disproportionality: A party can win a majority of seats with a minority of votes. In 2019, the BJP won 56% of Lok Sabha seats with 37% of the vote. In 2024, the BJP won 48% of seats with 36% of the vote. The Congress has also benefited from this disproportionality in the past. Small parties with evenly distributed support can be systematically underrepresented.
• Vote splitting: FPTP encourages strategic voting and vote splitting. If two parties with similar ideologies compete, their votes are split, and a third party with a unified base can win. This is why alliances and pre-poll seat-sharing arrangements are so important in Indian politics.
• Regional concentration: Parties with geographically concentrated support — like the DMK in Tamil Nadu or the TMC in West Bengal — do well under FPTP. Parties with diffuse national support — like the BSP or AAP in their early years — may underperform relative to their vote share.

Source: Election Commission of India. Figures for BJP, INC, DMK, TMC, SP and AAP; remainder categorised as Others.

Alternatives to FPTP

There have been periodic demands to replace FPTP with a proportional representation (PR) system or a mixed system. The Law Commission of India, in its 170th Report (1999), recommended a mixed system where 25-30% of seats would be filled by PR while the rest remained FPTP. The idea was to give smaller parties a voice while preserving the stability of FPTP. However, no government has acted on this recommendation. The existing parties, which have benefited from FPTP, have little incentive to change the system.

Other proposed reforms include:

• Two-round system: If no candidate gets a majority in the first round, a second round is held between the top two candidates. This would ensure that the winner has majority support, but it would also increase the cost and complexity of elections.
• Ranked-choice voting (AV/Instant Runoff): Voters rank candidates in order of preference. If no candidate gets a majority, the lowest-ranked candidate is eliminated, and their votes are redistributed. This is used in some countries (Australia, Ireland) but would require significant voter education in India.
• List PR: Voters vote for parties, and seats are allocated proportionally based on vote share. This would give smaller parties fair representation but would sever the direct link between voters and their constituency representative — a link that is culturally important in India.

Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections

India's President and Vice-President are elected indirectly by an electoral college. The President is elected by an electoral college consisting of the elected members of both Houses of Parliament and the elected members of the legislative assemblies of all states and Union Territories with legislatures. The Vice-President is elected by the members of both Houses of Parliament. Both elections use the single transferable vote system with proportional representation by means of secret ballot. The value of each vote is weighted based on the population of the state, giving larger states more influence. This is different from the FPTP system used for Lok Sabha and assembly elections.

Campaign Finance and Electoral Bonds

Indian elections are among the most expensive in the world. The Centre for Media Studies estimated that the 2024 Lok Sabha elections involved spending of over ₹1.35 lakh crore (approximately $16 billion), making it more expensive than the US presidential election. Much of this spending is opaque, unreported, and comes from unaccounted sources. Campaign finance reform has been a long-standing demand, but progress has been slow and sometimes regressive.

Expenditure Limits and Reporting

The ECI sets expenditure limits for candidates (not parties). For the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the limit was ₹95 lakh per candidate for larger states and ₹75 lakh for smaller states. For state assembly elections, the limit was ₹40 lakh per candidate. These limits are widely regarded as unrealistic — actual campaign spending, particularly by major parties, far exceeds them. Candidates circumvent the limits by having their parties or supporters spend on their behalf, which is not counted as their personal expenditure.

Every candidate must file an expenditure account with the ECI within 30 days of the election. The accounts are audited by the ECI and made public. However, the enforcement is weak, and penalties for violations are minimal. The real spending — on media, advertising, rallies, transportation, and voter inducements — is rarely captured in these accounts.

Electoral Bonds: A Brief History

The electoral bonds scheme was introduced through the Finance Act, 2017. It allowed any individual or corporate entity to purchase bonds from specified branches of the State Bank of India and donate them to registered political parties. The key feature — and the source of controversy — was that the donor's identity was not disclosed to the public or to the opposition. Only the receiving party knew who donated, and the State Bank of India, as the issuing bank, maintained records that the government could theoretically access.

The scheme was challenged in the Supreme Court on the grounds that it violated the right to information (Article 19(1)(a)) and created a regime of anonymous political funding that could enable corruption, quid pro quo, and foreign influence. In February 2024, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously struck down the electoral bonds scheme as unconstitutional. The Court held that:

• The right to information about the funding of political parties is an essential part of the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). Voters have a right to know who is funding the parties they vote for.
• The scheme was not a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2) because it was not narrowly tailored and created a disproportionate restriction on the flow of information.
• The anonymity of donors was not justified by the government's argument that it protected donors from harassment. The Court noted that the government itself had access to donor information, so the protection was selective and not genuine.
• The scheme violated the principle of level playing field by disproportionately benefiting the ruling party, which received the vast majority of electoral bond donations.

The Supreme Court ordered the State Bank of India to disclose the details of all electoral bond purchases and redemptions to the ECI, which was directed to publish the information on its website. The disclosures revealed that the ruling BJP had received the vast majority of donations — over ₹6,000 crore out of the total ₹12,000 crore in bonds issued. Major corporate donors included companies that had subsequently received government contracts, regulatory approvals, or bailouts, raising questions about quid pro quo.

Current State of Campaign Finance

After the Supreme Court struck down electoral bonds, the legal framework for political funding reverted to the pre-2017 system: donations up to ₹2,000 can be made in cash, donations above that must be by cheque or digital transfer, and parties must report all donations above ₹20,000 to the ECI. However, the pre-2017 system was also widely gamed, with donations just below the reporting threshold and with opaque corporate funding through shell companies.

Real campaign finance reform in India would require:

• State funding of elections: Public funding of political parties and elections would reduce dependence on private donors. Several democracies (Germany, Sweden, Mexico) provide state funding based on vote share or number of seats. India's Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998) recommended partial state funding, but it was never implemented.
• Expenditure limits for parties: Currently, expenditure limits apply only to candidates, not to parties. Parties spend unlimited amounts on advertising, rallies, and media. Limiting party expenditure would level the playing field.
• Real-time disclosure: Donations should be disclosed in real time or at least before elections, not months after. Voters have a right to know who is funding parties before they cast their vote.
• Strict auditing and penalties: The ECI should have the power to audit party accounts, investigate suspicious transactions, and impose meaningful penalties — including de-registration — for violations.
• Regulation of digital advertising: Digital advertising on social media platforms is now a major campaign expense. There is no effective regulation of this spending, no transparency about who is paying for ads, and no limit on how much can be spent. The ECI's guidelines for social media are weak and poorly enforced.

Model Code of Conduct

The Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is a set of guidelines issued by the Election Commission that regulates the behavior of political parties and candidates during elections. It is not a law — it is a voluntary code that the ECI enforces through its administrative powers under Article 324. However, some provisions of the MCC are also backed by laws such as the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and the Indian Penal Code.

Key Provisions

• General conduct: Parties and candidates must not indulge in activities that aggravate existing differences, create mutual hatred, or cause tension between castes, communities, or religious groups. They must not appeal to caste or communal feelings for securing votes.
• Meetings and processions: Parties must inform the local police before holding meetings or processions. They must not disturb the right of peaceful passage or access to public places. They must not use private property without permission.
• Polling day: All parties must cooperate with the authorities to ensure peaceful and orderly polling. They must not interfere with the distribution of voter slips, must not bring voters to the booth in organized transport, and must not campaign within 100 meters of a polling station. They must not intimidate voters or distribute inducements.
• Party in power: The ruling party must not use government machinery for campaign purposes. Ministers and other government officials must not make announcements of new schemes, projects, or appointments during the MCC period. Government buildings and vehicles must not be used for campaign events. The distinction between government work and party work must be maintained.
• Media and advertising: All paid political advertising must be clearly identified as such. The use of government media (Doordarshan, AIR) for campaign purposes is regulated by the ECI's time-sharing formula. Social media posts must comply with the same standards as other campaign communication.

Enforcement and Limitations

The MCC is enforced by the ECI through a hierarchy of observers, flying squads, and static surveillance teams. The ECI can issue warnings, censure, or directives to candidates and parties. In extreme cases, it can cancel the candidature of a person or even order a re-poll in a booth. However, because the MCC is not a law, the ECI cannot impose criminal penalties or jail time for violations. It relies on moral authority, media pressure, and the threat of administrative action.

The limitations of the MCC have become apparent in recent elections:

• Asymmetric enforcement: Opposition parties consistently allege that the ECI enforces the MCC more strictly against them than against the ruling party. High-profile ruling party leaders have been accused of making communal speeches, announcing government schemes during campaigns, and using religious symbols — with little or delayed ECI action.
• Hate speech: Despite the MCC prohibition on communal appeals, hate speech remains a persistent problem. The ECI's response has often been slow, and the penalties — temporary suspension of campaign privileges — are inadequate to deter repeat offenders.
• Government advertising: The ruling party often uses government advertising and welfare scheme announcements to influence voters before the MCC comes into force. The timing of major scheme launches just before elections is a well-known tactic that the MCC does not effectively prevent.
• Social media: The MCC applies to social media, but enforcement is weak. Parties and their supporters use WhatsApp, Facebook, X, and YouTube to spread misinformation, communal content, and voter suppression messages. The ECI's capacity to monitor and act on digital violations is limited.

Election Disputes and Petitions

An election can be challenged if it is vitiated by corrupt practices, illegal expenditure, or irregularities in the conduct of the poll. The procedure for challenging an election is set out in the Representation of the People Act, 1951. An election petition must be filed in the High Court of the state where the election was held, within 45 days of the declaration of results. There is no appeal from the High Court's decision — the matter goes directly to the Supreme Court if further challenged.

Grounds for Election Petitions

• Corrupt practices: These include bribery, undue influence, appeal on grounds of religion or caste, publication of false statements about a candidate's character, and hiring of vehicles for conveyance of voters. If a candidate is found guilty of a corrupt practice, they can be disqualified for up to six years.
• Illegal expenditure: If a candidate's election expenses exceed the prescribed limit, or if they fail to file their expenditure account, the election can be set aside. However, this ground is rarely invoked because the limits are so low that virtually all candidates exceed them, and selective enforcement would be arbitrary.
• Non-compliance with election law: If the election was not conducted in accordance with the law — for example, if polling booths were not set up, if ballot papers were invalid, if voters were illegally prevented from voting — the election can be challenged. The petitioner must prove that the non-compliance was substantial enough to affect the result.
• Disqualification of the candidate: If the winning candidate was not qualified to contest — for example, if they were underage, if they held an office of profit, if they were convicted of a disqualifying offense — the election can be set aside.

Bar on Judicial Interference

Article 329(b) of the Constitution bars courts from interfering in electoral matters until the election petition process is complete. This means that courts cannot stay the election process, postpone elections, or stop the counting of votes. The only remedy is an election petition after the results are declared. This provision is intended to prevent frivolous litigation from disrupting the electoral process, but it also means that serious irregularities cannot be corrected in real time.

In 2024, the Supreme Court clarified that while Article 329(b) bars interference in the election process, it does not bar courts from examining the constitutionality of laws that affect elections — such as the electoral bonds scheme or changes to the voting procedure. The bar applies to the conduct of specific elections, not to the legal framework governing elections.

Recent Reforms and Debates

India's electoral system has seen several significant changes and ongoing debates in recent years. Some of these are genuine reforms; others are contested as partisan or insufficient.

Key Recent Changes

• Electoral bonds struck down (2024): The Supreme Court's decision to strike down the electoral bonds scheme and order full disclosure of donors was the most significant campaign finance development in decades. It revealed the scale of anonymous funding and the dominance of the ruling party in such funding. The question now is whether the government will introduce a new, more transparent funding mechanism or revert to the old, opaque system.
• Linking Aadhaar to voter ID (2022-2024): The Election Commission launched a campaign to link Aadhaar numbers with voter ID (EPIC) cards, ostensibly to remove duplicate entries. The move was challenged on privacy grounds, and critics argued that it could be used to disenfranchise voters whose Aadhaar details did not match their voter records. The Supreme Court has held that Aadhaar linkage is voluntary, not mandatory, but the ECI's forms have been criticized for making it appear mandatory.
• Remote voting for migrants (pilot): The ECI has proposed remote voting machines (RVMs) to enable domestic migrants to vote from their place of work rather than their home constituency. This is a significant reform if implemented, as it would enfranchise millions of migrant workers. However, the pilot has been delayed, and there are technical and logistical concerns about how to verify eligibility and prevent multiple voting.
• One Nation, One Election: The government has proposed simultaneous elections for the Lok Sabha and all state assemblies, arguing that this would reduce costs, reduce disruption, and allow governments to focus on governance. Critics argue that it would centralize power, undermine federalism, and give national parties an advantage over regional parties. The proposal requires constitutional amendments and the consent of states, which is unlikely in the near term.
• Reservation for women (2023): The Constitution (106th Amendment) Act, 2023, provides for 33% reservation for women in the Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies. The reservation will take effect after a delimitation exercise based on the first census conducted after the Act's commencement. The delay has been criticized, but the Act represents a historic advance for women's political representation.
• Postal ballot expansion: During the COVID-19 pandemic, the ECI expanded postal ballot eligibility to include voters above 80 years, persons with disabilities, and essential service workers. The expansion has been made permanent, but it remains limited. There are demands for broader postal or early voting options, which the ECI has resisted due to fraud concerns.

Source: Lok Sabha Secretariat, PRS Legislative Research. Percentage of women MPs elected in each general election.

Ongoing Debates

• Role of the Governor in elections: Governors have discretionary powers in summoning state assemblies and can create delays that affect the timing of elections. The role of Governors has been a source of tension in several states, with opposition parties alleging that Governors act on the central government's instructions to delay elections or prevent opposition governments from functioning.
• Media regulation: There is no effective regulation of media bias during elections. Paid news — where newspapers and channels publish favorable content disguised as news in exchange for money — is a persistent problem. The ECI has identified cases of paid news and has required disclosure, but enforcement is weak and the problem remains widespread.
• Social media and AI: The use of deepfakes, AI-generated content, and targeted misinformation on social media platforms is a growing threat. The ECI has issued guidelines requiring disclosure of AI-generated content and has asked platforms to take down violative content, but the scale of content generation far exceeds the capacity of monitoring agencies.
• Criminal candidates: Despite the Supreme Court's efforts to accelerate criminal trials against politicians and require disclosure of criminal records, the number of candidates with criminal charges continues to rise. In the 2024 Lok Sabha, over 40% of elected MPs had criminal charges, including serious charges like murder, rape, and kidnapping. The political incentive to field "winnable" candidates with criminal backgrounds overrides the normative commitment to clean politics.

What Citizens Can Do

Electoral integrity is not solely the responsibility of the Election Commission. Citizens have a critical role in ensuring free and fair elections. Here are practical steps every voter can take:

Before Elections

• Verify your voter registration: Check your name on the electoral roll using the ECI website or the Voter Helpline App. If you have moved, apply for a change of address. If you have turned 18, apply for registration. If you find errors, apply for correction using Form 8.
• Check candidate backgrounds: The ECI requires all candidates to file affidavits disclosing their criminal record, assets, liabilities, and educational qualifications. These affidavits are published on the ECI website and on websites like ADR India (adrindia.org). Read them before deciding whom to vote for. A candidate with serious criminal charges or unexplained wealth growth should raise red flags.
• Report violations: The ECI operates a cVIGIL app that allows citizens to report MCC violations with photo and video evidence. The app is available on Android and iOS. You can also report violations to the district election office or the ECI's toll-free helpline (1950).
• Fact-check campaign claims: Candidates and parties make numerous claims about their achievements and opponents' failures. Fact-check these claims using government data, independent research, and fact-checking platforms. Do not share unverified claims on social media.

During Elections

• Vote: Turnout matters. Low turnout benefits organized and motivated vote bases. Your vote is your voice. Even if you do not like any candidate, consider voting NOTA (None of the Above) to register your dissatisfaction rather than staying home.
• Observe polling: If you have the time, volunteer as a polling agent for a candidate or as an independent observer. Polling agents represent candidates at the polling station and can challenge irregularities, object to ineligible voters, and ensure that the EVM is sealed properly.
• Monitor for inducements: Report any distribution of cash, liquor, gifts, or other inducements to voters. This is a corrupt practice and a criminal offense. Use the cVIGIL app or call the police.
• Document irregularities: If you witness violence, intimidation, booth capturing, or malfunctioning EVMs, document it with photos and videos and report it immediately to the presiding officer or the ECI helpline.

After Elections

• Track elected representatives: Use platforms like PRS Legislative Research (prsindia.org) and MyMP (myneta.info) to track how your MP or MLA is performing — their attendance, questions asked, participation in debates, and asset declarations.
• File RTIs: If you suspect misuse of public funds by an elected representative, file a Right to Information (RTI) application to obtain relevant documents. The RTI Act is a powerful tool for accountability.
• Participate in civic forums: Join or form local civic groups that monitor governance, organize public meetings with elected representatives, and demand accountability. Democracy does not end on election day.
• Challenge if necessary: If you have evidence of serious electoral malpractice, consider filing an election petition. This is a complex legal process, but civil society organizations and lawyers can provide guidance.

Sources